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Summary. - North-South relations have been characterized by three ideological phases. The 
first started with a long period of ideological harmony, lasting into the early 1970s. It was inter- 
rupted by OPEC and the period of radical Southern ferment, to be followed by another, opposed 
divide when the United States shifted into conservative ideological posturing and actions with the 
first Reagan Administration. The second Reagan Administration’s shift to the Baker Plan 
represents the third phase but can also be regarded as consistent with that ideological position. 
I. INTRODUCTION 2. HEGEMONY AND CONSENSUS 
Most economists seek to retreat into a “value 
free” neutrality. Such neutrality is a dream or a 
nightmare, depending on your preferences; but 
in either case it remains a figment of one’s 
imagination. 
Relations in the economic sphere, between the 
developing and the developed countries, evolved 
with substantial if diminishing tranquility until 
the early 1970s. 
I propose to argue rather frontally instead that 
ideological perceptions, attitudes and prefer- 
ences have defined the context in which impor- 
tant issues of political economy, affecting econ- 
omic relations among the developing and the 
developed countries, have been debated and, in 
some critical areas, even decided upon. In 
particular, a long period of relative ideological 
harmony, lasting almost into the early 197Os, has 
been disturbed by two dramatic and altogether 
opposed ideological divides. 
One resulted in the period of radical Southern 
ferment, in the aftermath of the OPEC successes 
in 1971 and 1973. The other followed thereafter, 
originating in the election of President Reagan in 
1979 and defined by his Administration’s policies 
in the first term which ushered in militant 
conservative activism, not merely at home but 
also in foreign economic policy. 
The ideology that provided the rationale and 
the cement during this postwar period was not 
universally shared, of course, by all actors in the 
international economy. But this was definitely a 
period of substantial hegemonic consensus 
around what we now call the Liberal Inter- 
national Economic Order (LIEO). International 
governance was provided by the Bretton Woods 
multilateral institutions which reflected the 
virtues of freer trade via the GATT, promoted 
capital flows to the developing countries via the 
World Bank and sought to provide the internal 
macroeconomic stability and external balance on 
which prosperity could be built, from the result- 
ing trade and freed private capital flows and 
investments, via the IMF. 
Since the United States is a force majeure and 
despite all caveats the central actor on this scene, 
and since I believe that the recent shift in 
Southern postures towards moderation is en- 
dangered by our ideological posturing and 
actions which have replaced theirs, I will also 
underline the folly of our ways through President 
Reagan’s first term. I will also take the opportun- 
ity to put into similar ideological perspective the 
recent actions of the Reagan Administration in 
its second term. 
This consensus did, however, permit several 
accommodations that suited evolving changes in 
the structure of the world economy and in the 
number of countries emerging from colonial 
status into independence. But these changes did 
not constitute a fundamental change in the 
central thrust of the system. 
*This is the text of the Bernard Fain Lecture delivered 
at Brown University on 1X April 1985. It has been 
revised and updated with the insertion of Section 4 in 
view of the important developments in US policy. 
popularly described as the “Baker Plan,” which oc- 
curred after the Lecture was delivered. 
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The newly formed developing countries were 
particularly consciou\ that the Bretton Woods 
structure was created when they did not exist as 
states and that while exit was politically infeasible 
and economically unwise. their voice wa5 largely 
muted by voting arrangements that precluded II 
major role for them. They gradually clamored 
therefore to change these realities. 
Again, the economic ideology of the Liberal 
International Economic Order increasingly 
found itself at odds with the challenge of acceler- 
ated development that faced the leaders in many 
developing countries. The great economic his- 
torian, Alexander Gcrschenkron, has hypothe- 
sized that the more economically backward 21 
nation is. the greater will he the compulsion for 
the State to Intervene ancl manage. IIe has 
forcefully argued this insight to be supported by 
historical evidence. There is little doubt that this 
factor fueled the desire of several developing 
countries to turn to protectionism. rather than 
free trade. as they raced to increase their growth. 
and thus reduce their poverty. through 
industrialization in the early postwar decades. 
But the basic premises of the Liberal Inter- 
national Economic Order were already being 
frayed somewhat at the margin in other areas of 
North-South interaction. such as foreign invcst- 
ment and skilled migration. It was argued. for 
instance. that the “benign neglect” under the 
Benthamite Bretton Woods structure may 
immiserize rather than enrich the developing 
countries - that therefore. it constituted in 
reality ;I “malign neglect” model and. in certain 
radical critiques, even :I “malign intent” model. 
For example. multinational investments in 
developing countries were considered subversive 
instruments of neocolonial destabilization and 
control. while the “brain drain” from these 
countries was viewed as an unconscionable raid- 
ing of the Southern talents and human capital by 
the developed North.’ The Chilean economist, 
Oswaldo Sunkel, puts it aptly: integration into 
the world economy Ieads to disintegration of the 
national economy. 
These differing intellectual viewpoints. depart- 
ing from the ideological premises of the LIE0 
consensus, were, however, riot the central tend- 
ency, at least among the important policymakers 
in most of the developing countries. The dis- 
harmony that they entailed in the LIE0 
framework was therefore quite manageable. And 
indeed it U’LIS managed by accommodating 
responses in the Bretton Woods institutions. 
responses which left the main system intact, in 
my judgement.’ 
Thus. at the GATT in particular. developing 
countries were accommodated in their principal 
demands. Part IV was introduced. virtually 
exempting them from much of the GATT disci- 
pline on MFN and GATT practice on reciprocity. 
This led the way to the granting of GSP 
(Generalized System of Preferences) through 
waiver of Articlc I of GATT. (But it also 
legitim:lted the exccssivc and unduly protracted 
protectionism that many of the developing coun- 
tries practiced into the lY7Os. resulting in their 
own failure to reap the rewards of more effective 
integration into xi expanding world economy.‘) 
I consider these changes in GATT to be 
accommod~itionist as the developing countries at 
the time were relatively unimportant in world 
trade and trade was growing by Icaps and bounds 
anyway under GATT-spawned trade liberaliza- 
tion. One could even take the cynical view, that. if 
developing countries wanted to 4ioot theniselve\ 
in the foot by restricting their ow’n trade. they 
should be given that privilege to continue as 
GATT members. ,Yo~r,. the story is quite differ-- 
ent. of course. The end of the Golden Age of the 
lY5Os and lY6Os. and the rise of 1il;lcroecononiic 
difficulties and attendant fueling of protectionist 
sentiments in the industrialized countries have 
prompted a reversal of these indulgent attitudes. 
GSP is no longer readily conceded. The newly 
industrialized developing countries - the NICs, 
or the SOUTHNICS as I prefer to characterize 
them for their aspiration to transit eventually 
from the ranks of the South to the North - are 
increasingly under pressure to “@u;Lte.” 
Again, the dogged sentiment in the Umted States 
for “fair trade” as against “free trade.” substitut- 
ing “aggressive reciprocity” for the traditional 
GATT-sanctioned reciprocity, extends in- 
creasingly to the SOUTHNI(‘S as well.’ 
At the IMF. the accommodation took the form 
of creating low,-condition~itity facilities such as 
the Compensatory Financing Facility in lYh3 and 
the Buffer Stock Facility in IYhY. At the World 
Bank, the IFC (International Finance Corpora- 
tion) was set up in lYS6 and the IDA (Inter- 
national Development Agency). the astonish- 
ingly soft-loan facility, in IYhO. 
At the institutional level. the response con- 
sisted in the creation in lY64 of the UNCTAD, a 
specialized UN agency to address the problems 
of the developing countries. While, in the last 
decade, precisely because of the ideological 
upheavals that I will presently describe, this 
agency has become anathema to the United 
States in particular, so that UNCTAD is treated 
as if it were UNWASHED and UNKEMPT, at 
the time of its creation it was viewed in far less 
alarming terms (though the United States did 
initially oppose its creation as unnecessary). As 
you doubtless feel overwhelmed by many of the 
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acronyms I have put before you, let me entertain 
you by recounting how, when the United Nations 
Fund for Economic Development was set up, the 
word Special was desperately added to it so that. 
instead of UNFED, it would turn into SUNFED, 
suggesting the tropical luxuriance of SUNKIST 
oranges if not of the equatorial forests! 
I would argue then that a broad, if necessarily 
fragile. consensus on the international economic 
management structure, or what we might call the 
superstructure defining the ‘*governance of the 
world economy,” did obtain through the 1950s 
and 1960s. Alongside this consensus was also a 
certain tolerance of differing political preferences 
of individual countries and for basic differences 
in the economic policy mix that these countries 
might choose. Thus, while the World Bank did. 
under Eugene Black’s Presidency. indulge in 
sentiments against lending to public sector pro- 
jects, this attitude was not long sustained. Mao 
Tse-tung evidently did not mean it when he asked 
for a hundred flowers to bloom. But the diversity 
of politics and economics that was tolerated by 
the hegemonic United States and other major 
actors in the corridors of power during the 1950s 
and 1960s was a reality, in my judgement 
(though, as my radical friends will remind me, 
this tolerance often did not extend to those at the 
extreme left end of the political spectrum). 
3. THE FIRST IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE 
The success of OPEC in the early 1970s 
shattered the prevailing consensus, ushering in 
the first of the two ideological upheavals that 
have afflicted North-South relations. There were 
three major ideological aspects to the OPEC 
model. 
First, it suggested that unilateral action by 
developing countries, in concert, could redistri- 
bute income to them from the developed world. 
Compared to the voluntary, and in fact limited 
and declining redistribution through foreign aid, 
which depended on the altruism or enlightened 
self-interest of the North, such unilaterally ex- 
tracted redistribution evidently had sex appeal. 
Besides, the numbers involved were truly col- 
ossal, giving redistribution a role equal to the 
traditional, growth-related, route to develop- 
mental objectives. 
Second, unlike aid, such redistribution implied 
sovereignty in the use of the redistributed re- 
sources. This aspect had evident appeal to 
developing countries seeking greater control over 
their political destinies. I should say that OPEC’s 
success came at a time when economic aid had 
become increasingly tied to performance criteria. 
While such strings are appropriate from an 
economic viewpoint, and are indeed inevitable 
when parliaments and congresses have to be 
convinced that aid is usefully spent, they have 
always created a diplomatic problem between 
donors and recipients. Indeed. by the early 
1970s. the evolution of the performance criteria 
into detailed “conditionality” and monitoring by 
donors and by their occasional “aid consortia” 
had begun to cause considerable friction. The 
OPEC model cut through this difficulty: the 
earned redistribution of resources would be 
automatically free from conditionalities and 
strings. 
Third. the route to success ri la OPEC was 
through control over primary resources, and 
through the exercise of the power that followed 
therefrom. Both aspects had immediate ideo- 
logical implications. Control would lend legiti- 
macy to attempts at nationalization and, more 
weakly, to regulation and direction of the multi- 
nationals that were often in the primary, extrac- 
tive industries of the developing countries. 
Exercise of the power from such control implied 
cartelization and utilization of the resulting 
monopoly power, as with OPEC. The former 
violated the premise of freer multinational in- 
vestments, the latter the premise of free trade - 
both ideologically at the center of the LIE0 
philosophy. 
These perceptions were not simply intellectual; 
they had their counterpart in the international 
politics of North-South economic relations. They 
were thus to break the ideological, hegemonic 
consensus. A significant number of developing 
countries would now have an ideological concep- 
tion that put them in a confrontational posture 
with the developed countries. 
Also, the conflict would be militant. The 
perception of “commodity power” vis-ci-vi.7 the 
developed countries meant that the ideological 
differences could be translated into demands for 
negotiations on changes in the governance of the 
world economy. The LIE0 era of consensus and 
of resource transfer by entreaty and moral 
suasion would now be replaced by demands for a 
New International Economic Order, the cel- 
ebrated NIEO in the South but the infamous 
NIEO in the North. These demands would be 
made with a rhetoric that was often passionate; 
and the Suslovs of the NIEO, trained doubtless 
at the seats of learning in the North, would 
provide the articulation and substance to the 
rhetoric. 
An important facet of this ideological divide 
(which was to help precipitate the second. 
ensuing and opposite ideological era) was the use 
of the United Nations as the forum for making 
these demands. This was perhaps inevitable as 
the United Nations is the natural meeting ground 
for diplomats who would bc charged with pursu- 
ing the NIEO objectives. It was also an inevit- 
able, preferred choice since the developing coun- 
tries outnumber the devclopcd there and votes 
are not weighted by wealth or its proxy. financial 
contributions. 
But it did mean that the issues put into the 
NIEO demands would broaden to accommod~~tc 
all, that focus and priorities would be lost. and 
that the interests of the power-ful specialized 
agencies of Bretton Woods would be thrcatcncd. 
The unwieldiness of the NIEC) den~ands, which 
embraced finance. aid, trade. and a host of other 
issues. was evident in the later demands for what 
came to br called Glohlrl Ncgoticrrior~.s. Emerging 
from the I Havana Nonaligned Movement (NAM) 
meeting in 1979, in the immediate aftermath of 
the second oil price increase of 80%. these 
demands for Global Negotiations at the IJnited 
Nations never (rot anywhere; the amibitious 
scope and conte%s of ;he NIEO-type meeting 
received an indifferent and at time\ contemptu- 
ous Northern response. Why? 
The essential reason was that negotiations 
simply could not be conducted in the style 01. with 
the substance that the alleged “commodity 
powci-” was s~~pposed to ,justify. It was manifest. 
already by the late 197Os, that bauxite and 
banana wcrc different from oil. Indeed. even 
OPEC was in distress, and beginning finally to 
have to act like a cartel, as the world economy 
stumbled into ;I m:tjor slump. The South was thus 
caught in an uncomfortable situation: its NIEO 
postures were predicated on ;I presumption of 
power that had been illusory and was scc’n by the 
North clearly to be so. 
A shift to moderate pragmatism was thus 
necessary. This clearly happened, admittedly 
with much recrimination and nostalgia, through 
19X3 and culminated in the New Delhi NAM 
meeting in March 1984. 
4. THE SECOND IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE 
By this time, however. we were deeply into the 
militancy of the United States. The Reagan 
Administration’s revisionist approach to North- 
South relations was twofold. 
Not only did it seek to reverse what it 
perceived as an ideological surrender to statism 
and intervention in the different multilateral 
agencies (via their very existence or through their 
methods of functioning), it also proceeded, in 
consequence. to become intolerant of the plur- 
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alistic political and economic approaches to 
development. 
The conviction with which the advantages of 
the invisible hand, and the disadvantage\ of the 
visible hand. were propagated and attempted to 
be imposed on the faithless infidels whenever 
possible. tempts one to describe this period as 
Tlzc, Age of C‘wnirlr!. It has also produced 
turbulence. Let me elaborate, taking the ques- 
tions of multilateralism and the market ideology. 
in turn. as they border on North-South economic 
relations. 
On multil~~teralism. I think it i\ fair to say that 
the Aclrninistration has generally preferred the 
Bretton Woods tnstitutions to the United Na- 
tions. has tried to reshape these institutions into ;I 
conservative image and, where necessary for its 
purpose. simply opted for the bilateral route. 
supplemented where feasible by goupings based 
on “like-minded” nation\. 
The conservative voice in the United States has 
turned steadily and standfastly against the IJnitcd 
Nations in recent years. The confrontations over 
the NIEO between the (i-77 (Group of 77 that 
represents the developing countries C/I bloc, at the 
United Nations) and the US representatives from 
Senator Moynihan to Dr Jeane Kirkpatrick and 
her articulate aides have been as much ;I cause as 
;I consequence of this anti-IJN sentiment. The 
battles at 1JNESCO over the “information 
order.” in which the western nations have been 
arguing at cross-purposes with the developing 
countries. and the iresulting US withdrawal have 
been ;I contributory factor. That the Soviet bloc 
often sides with the developing countries has 
been ;I sore point. The frequency of such 
“alignment” has been erroneously interpreted 
and denounced as the developing countries 
voting with the Soviet bloc. reducing the United 
States to a position of bring “in opposition.“’ 
The following quotes, chosen from a multitude 
of such pronouncements, from the influential 
conservative think tank. the Heritage Founda- 
tion, illustrate my point. On the United Nations 
generally: 
the work of the U.N. is more suspect than at an) 
time in its history. It was not solely an exaggeration 
when James J. Kirkpatrick wrote on Septemhcr 27. 
19XI . in 7%~~ Bu//i~~orr~ .S~trl that the “purpose [of the 
U.N.] as a forum has hccn reduced to nullity” and 
suggested that the media “should carry new\ 01 the 
U .N. hack on the comic pages to dlcal with 
Dooneshury and his friends.” There arc questions. 
too, as to whether the US. is hcncfiting Tram its 
U.N. memhership, given the paralysis of the Sccur- 
ity (‘ouncil and the anti-American, anti-We\tcrn. 
anti-industrial, anti-capitalist majority in the Ckn- 
eraI Assemhlv.” 
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More specifically, on economic issues and 
ideology: 
Most dangerous is the U.N.‘s de fucto (and 
sometimes dr jure) crusade against the free enter- 
prise system. In many respects. the U.N. has 
bccomc the headquarters. command post and 
strategic planning center of an anti-fret-enterprise 
campnign. In almost every U.N. body and almost 
always in the General Assembly, seldom is an 
opportunity lost to attack the free enterprise sys- 
tem. 
And rtw U. N. crusudr attacks the very esscncc 
and philosophical base of the free enterprise sys- 
tem, It is an assault which condemns :tlmost always. 
without supporting evidence. the notion that the 
dynamo of growth and economic expansion is 
individual initiative, creativity and the inccntivc 
provided by the opportunity of making :L profit. 
This kind of attack CW,! rq~uliutes /lie r~riorr oj 
economic growth, .suhsrilurirlfi fiw It dw tmivr crrld 
econonCdiy se//-defeeuritlg c0rm~pt.s of wecrlit7 
redistrihuiiwf urld cmfrrrl thmirz,q.’ (Italics in- 
serted) 
The negative attitudes toward the United 
Nations have carried over into increasingly asser- 
tive ideological postures at multilateral economic 
agencies such as UNCTAD. The role that 
UNCTAD played in focusing early on important 
issues, such as tariff-escalation that generates 
high effective or value-added protection against 
developing countries, has been ignored and the 
“politicization” of the agency has been singled 
out for condemnation.’ 
If the United Nations has been discounted 
thus, the specialized agencies that constitute the 
central pillars of the Bretton Woods edifice have 
emerged as the arenas where the United States 
prefers to act. Correspondingly, there have been 
strong urges, and serious attempts, to purge 
these agencies of liberal heresies and any per- 
ceived conflicts with the play of market forces. 
At the IMF. for example, the Administration 
has opposed the use of the Extended Facility 
(EF) which was set up originally in 1974 to 
provide longer-term finance to facilitate “structu- 
ral adjustment.” It also opposed, with not one 
member in support of this position, the granting 
of a substantial EF loan to India on the ideo- 
logical ground that, despite the tragic experience 
of South America, India should first exploit 
private lending rather than turn to the IMF for 
such financing. 
Again, on the Compensatory Financing Facil- 
ity (CFF), the low-conditionality window at the 
IMF. the United States was primarily responsible 
for restricting its utility (since August 1979) by 
requiring that any borrowing in excess of 50% of 
the CFF quota could now occur only if the IMF 
were satisfied that the member country was 
cooperating with the IMF. By 1983, the condi- 
tions under which drawings could be made were 
changed towards virtually eliminating its soft- 
conditionality character.” 
On the debt situation generally, the Adminis- 
tration at first took the “benign neglect” view, 
asserting that laissrz-firirr would suffice. When 
the urgency of the debt situation became evident, 
there was a rush to the IMF to provide the 
necessary surveillance and conditionalities and 
for its quotas to be increased. The Congress. 
having been duly briefed earlier on the Adminis- 
tration’s criticisms of EF, CFF and other liberal 
excesses of the IMF. was now in the position of 
being told that the IMF should be strengthened 
to become the spearhead of the Administration‘s 
efforts to manage the debt crisis.“’ 
Until recently, the treatment of the World 
Bank was consistent with the ideological aspira- 
tions I have just detailed. The United States has 
been a principal advocate of extensive market- 
oriented conditionality on the Structural Adjust- 
ment Loans, the program of the Bank that is 
fraternal to the EF program of the IMF across 
the street (leading to inevitable jurisdictional 
tensions so that there is now an East-Bank-West- 
Bank problem on the Potomac as well). It has 
also undermined efforts at IDA replenishment. 
Constituting the softest-loan window of the 
World Bank, of considerable value to the poorest 
countries, the IDA has always been a central 
component of Bank lending. The Administration 
dragged its feet, virtually in isolation. on IDA 
replenishment as late as 1984, seeking a deep cut 
in the level of its operation. 
Furthermore, bilateral initiatives and more 
narrowly multilateral efforts among “like- 
minded” nations have gained ground under the 
present Administration. Foreign aid has been 
dramatically refashioned in the Soviet image. 
Reflecting quid pro quo bilateralism, it is now 
increasingly and overwhelmingly bilateral, 
hugely tied into security objectives. and selec- 
tively channelled to countries of strategic value to 
the United States. The principal beneficiaries of 
the bilateral US aid program are no longer the 
poor nations, who are thus caught in the squeeze 
between multilateral efforts (such as the IDA) 
that are threatened by US opposition and a vastly 
diminished bilateral assistance. President Reagan 
is reputed to have admonished the developing 
countries at the Cancun Summit that develop- 
ment is a difficult business; evidently, his Ad- 
ministration’s aid policies seem to be directed at 
ensuring that it remains that way! 
The impatience with multilateralism and the 
desire to forge ahead with whomever will come 
on board is also manifest in some of the trade 
moves made by the Administration. The 
embrace of the European-style preferentia- 
grouping approach. as in the recent initiative for 
the Free Trade Area with Israel. the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative grant of discriminatorv prcfcr- 
ences, the bilateral deals on scrvicex with Israel 
and Canada. indicate a willingness to cornpro- 
rnise the spirit of multilater~ilisni. Some of these 
moves reflect a reaction to domestic protectionist 
pressures: others are responses to lobbies ac- 
tively seeking markets abroad. But the overall 
polit&l thrust towards bilateral moves is indeed 
laced by the militancy that is characteristic of the 
Administration: if other GATT members want to 
move slowly. we will bypass them and pursue our 
trade objectives with anyone who comes along 
with us. Since US impatience is combined with a 
desire to extend GATT to a set of rules to 
facilitate private foreign investments, the milit- 
ancy also has an ideological cutting edge. 
The ideological asscrtivcness that animates 
these new directions in US policv towards 
multilateralism and international insfitutions is 
also manifest in the Administration’s postures 
and actions clscwhere which show, unabashed 
support of 1narket approaches. 
Thus. the Administration withdrew support 
from the carefully negotiated Law of the Sea 
Treaty because of its “statist” provisions concern- 
ing an international seabed authority and its 
powers. Again. it was the only nation that 
refused to sign the international convention that 
was adopted at the United Nations on guidelines 
for marketing baby food formula ~ a response to 
the tragic consequences caused by transplanta- 
tion of developed-country marketing practices to 
the very different conditions in the developing 
countries. 
At the 1984 Mexico Conference on population, 
the Administration insisted on the absurd doc- 
trine that population growth would necessarily be 
benign in that it would automatically generate 
the income required to maintain itself. I call this 
a doctrinal shift from the hand-to-mouth theory 
of population in the poor countries to the 
hand-and-mouth theory! Again, it was a celebra- 
tion of the doctrine that lrrissez-fbirc is ideal: it 
would produce not merely babies, but also the 
formula. pampers and cribs to take care of them. 
And the Earth had room for all! The other 
nations at the Conference were baffled by these 
assertions. They laughed in the corridors. But 
still they went along in the conference halls. 
yielding to the United States what it seemed to 
want so badly. 
Indeed. the Administration succeeded in these 
ideological moves well beyond what one might 
have been led to believe by those who talk and 
write of the loss of US dominance and the rise of 
;I multipolar power configuration in its place. 
I believe that the reason is that the US has 
temporarily reverted to its dominant position in 
the world economy. The Kc~ig;in”mics-induced 
world recession smiultaneously broke OPEC 
power and reduced the Third World, especially 
the important debt-carrying countries. to a rela- 
tively impotent status. Wcstcrn Europe has also 
been plagued by high levels of uncmploymcnt 
and a revival of stagnationist. defeatist doctrines. 
Japan is economically strong but heavily coin- 
strained by the growing xenophobia that its 
success has fed almost evcrywherc. Prudential 
acceptance of US positions. particularly when 
passionately held and of no direct consequence to 
one’s strategic interests (a condition not met by 
the Soviet gas pipclinc episode where the Euro- 
peans stood up to US pressures). has thus been 
the rule. 
5. TIIE BAKER PLAN: AN IDEOLOGICAL 
QUICKSTEP 
The only silver lining to this black cloud. 
casting its shadow over North-South relations, 
has been provided by the dramatic shift in US 
policy towards the debt crisis. Mr Baker, the new 
Secretary of the Treasury, has faced up to the 
obvious folly of the policy of “malign neglect” of 
the international economy. by beginning to pull 
us back from the abyss that failure to intervene 
and to attempt coordination of economic policies 
among the major OECD countries implied - 
e.g. via high interest rates and the overvaluation 
of the dollar. Equally, his initiative at the Seoul 
meeting of the IMF and the World Bank in 
October 1985, to shift the debt strategy from its 
deflationist, IMF-centered, hard-line approach 
to the World-Bank-centered soft-line approach 
has shown pragmatism and greater awareness of 
the needs of the debt-ridden countries, and a 
recognition that the hard-line policies were 
simply unworkable, counterproductive and im- 
periling the world economy as many had warned 
to no avail.” 
But it is interesting that, even as Mr Baker has 
turned the first-term policies around on this 
question, the market ideology remains strongly 
in place. indeed even more explicitly so than to 
date. For. the added funds that Mr Baker seeks 
to galvanize and channel via the World Bank and 
other programs to the indebted countries, inad- 
equate as they still are to the necessities.12 are 
explicitly to be made conditional on domestic 
measures to encourage the market forces, both 
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domestic and the private foreign investments. 
Hence, the widely-acclaimed shift to pragmat- 
ism is still cloaked in the ideological cloth that 
distinguished the rise of President Reagan. In 
fact, from a broader perspective, the Baker Plan 
itself can be construed as a creature of ideology 
- as a minimalist shift of the first-term strategy 
on debts required by the overheating of the debt 
crisis. It is worth noting that the Baker Plan 
surfaced when President Garcia of Peru had 
already acted with bravado and alacrity and 
President de la Madrid of Mexico was dropping 
alarming hints that, in the absence of net inflows 
such as those that the Baker Plan aims to 
generate, his acceptance of the hard-line con- 
ditionalities had been meaningless and that Mex- 
ico might opt for more radical solutions to the 
debt problem. The transition from the IMF- 
centered strategy still rejects the radical “non- 
market” solutions to the debt-overhang problem 
offered by many such as Professors Albert 
Fishlow and Peter Kenen and the New York 
financier Felix Rohatyn. In fact, the new strategy 
represents a continuation of the market-oriented 
war on the debt problem by other means. 
The ideological orientation of the Baker Plan 
is thus evident both in its origin and in the 
conditionalities it carries. It is thus a brilliant, 
ideological quick-step. President Reagan and his 
team have indeed responded to pragmatic rea- 
ity. But they continue to fine-tune as they do so, 
yielding no more than they think they can get 
away with on the ideological front. The next turn 
of the screw, as the debt crisis hits the headlines 
again, should tell how far the Reagan Adminis- 
tration is prepared to go as its ideology confronts 
yet more disquieting realities. 
NOTES 
I The concepts and themes touched upon hcrc have 
been developed at greater length hy me in two essays. 
reprinted in Bhagwati (lYXSa), Chaps. 1 and 2. 
2. There is. of course, the classic prohlem of 
deciding whether the glass is half empty or half full. 
What I describe below. however. suggests definitely 
that the glass was more than half full, in support of my 
interpretation. 
3. The losses from such protectionist exccsscs in the 
import-substituting countries have been set forth in 
detail in several empirical studies. including those 
conducted under major projects: the Little-Scitovsky- 
Scott OECD project. the Balassa IBRD project. and 
the Bhagwati-Krueger and Krueger NBER projects. 
The findings of most of these studies have been 
reviewed and synthesized in the Bhagwati-Srinivasan 
essay which is Chapter 6 in Bhagwati (19XSa). 
4. Traditional reciprocity implied matching of first 
diffcrcnccs. i.e. changes in levels of protection. 
Aggressive reciprocity implies matching of total levels 
of protection or openness of markets. The latter implies 
in practice a greater proneness to sectoral and bilateral 
trade approaches and a corresponding threat to 
multilateralism. not just to freer trade. 
5. The phrasing is Moynihan’s. As careful scholars 
have noted, rhc Soviet Union often votes with G-77 on 
economic issues simply for political reasons but with 
absolutely no intention of assuming any of the multi- 
lateral obligations towards the developing countries 
that the Resolutions in question require. See Padma 
Desai’s (1984) analysis of the Soviet emphasis on what 
she aptly christens “quid pro quo bilateralism” as 
against assumption of multilateral economic obligations 
internationally. 
6. Heritage Foundation (lY7X). 
7. Heritage Foundation (10X3) 
8. The extensive range of the efforts which have 
been made to “take on” UNCTAD. and other UN 
agencies, has hccn noted in a frank and pointed speech 
delivered on 10 September lY84. by Ambassador 
Dubey, Permanent R’eprcsentative of India to the UN 
Office in Geneva, a distinguished participant in the 
developmental activities and multilateral initlativcs at 
the United Nations over two decades. These efforts 
have extended in his view to strong-arm tactics: “What 
is worse is that the trends of the UN institutions and 
other individuals holding important positions in them 
are hcing singled out for being maligned and made the 
target of bitter personal criticism. A systematic effort is 
being made to undermine the independence. objcctiv- 
ity and the initiative of these institutions by trying to 
determine in advance [sic] the kind of documents that 
they should produce.” 
9. In an important review of the CFF. tracing its 
evolution from 1963 to what is characterized ai its 
“abolition” in 19X3. Dell (1985. n. 245) has detailed 
how the “IMF decision of i4 September 19X3. while it 
preserves the name CFF. destroys the basic purpose of 
the facility.” 
10. This episode has prompted a critic to remark: 
“Resentful of the Administration’s flip-flop. Congress 
barely passed a multi-billion-dollar authorization. It 
was a long and bitter debate. which ultimately cast 
grave doubt on US support for the world‘s most 
effective financial organization. It would bc a long time 
before Congress again approved new funds for the 
IMF.” See Gartcn (1985). p. SS3. 
774 WORLD DEVELOPMENI 
I I. I have examined the factors that prompted the US optimistic numbers under the Baker Plan will make 
moves in Bhagwati ( IYXSh). negligible net (of the overhang) funds av;~ilable. over a 
limited period. to the indehted countries. 
12. Professor Albert Fishlow has noted that the most 
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